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THE DOUBLE CRIMINALITY RULE REVISITED
Sharon A. Williams*
I. Introduction
Extradition law and process is the complex vehicle for the return by
one state of accused or convicted fugitives from the criminal justice of
another state. From an international law perspective, it is for the most
part, a treaty matter bearing on the rights and duties of states and the
emphasis is on inter-state cooperation, reciprocity and mutuality of
obligations.' However, it is also part of the domestic criminal law
process and as the result will be the potential or actual deprivation of
the liberty or even the life of the fugitive, if the requesting state retains
the death penalty, today extradition is seen as necessarily protecting the
human rights of the fugitive.
The focus of this article is on the protection given to the fugitive by
the double or dual criminality rule under the extradition law of Canada 
2
Two major issues will be analyzed. Firstly, whether the crime for which
* Professor of Public International Law and International Criminal Law, Osgoode Hall
Law School, Canada.
1 M. C. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order (Leyden, Sjthoff,
1974) 314.
2 See the Extradition Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. E-23. Hereinafter "Extradition Act. It should
be noted that the rendition of fugitives from Canada to reciprocating states in the
Commonweath scheme under the Fugitive Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. F-32 will not
be addressed. This is a separate process with no treaties required and no list of
renditable offences appended to the statute, premised upon the historical connection
of the member states and the belief at the inception of the scheme towards the end
of the nineteenth century that the formal safeguards and rigidity of extradition with
"foreign" states was not necessary or appropriate. There is in the Canadian Fugitive
Offenders Act no list of extraditable offences and no provision for double criminality.
This is to be contrasted with the enactment by several other Commonwealth coun-
tries, including the United Kingdom, of new legislation that provides for the same
safeguards for the fugitive as extradition such as double criminality. It is suggested
that Canada's rendition process should be brought into line in this regard. See for
more detail Sharon A. Williams, 'The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A
Comparative Analysis" (1991) 15 Nova L. I. 582, 584, 618-623.
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the extradition request is made by the foreign state is an extraditable
crime meeting the requirement of double criminality and secondly,
whether the extradition judge in Canada is mandated to inquire into
and seek evidence of the foreign criminal law.
II. Foundations of the Double Criminality Rule
It is a basic precept of extradition law, contained in many states'
domestic extradition legislation and bilateral treaties, that there be the
threshold requirement of double criminality. Under this rule, the of-
fence for which the fugitive is sought must, based upon reciprocity, be
one for which the requested state could in turn be able to make a
request. It may be seen as being premised on the maxim nulla poena
sine lege, or "no punishment without law".3 As Oppenheim succinctly
stated: "No person may be extradited whose deed is not a crime accord-
ing to the criminal law of the state which is asked to extradite as well
as the state which demands extradition".
4
Double criminality has nevertheless not been viewed as a principle
of customary international law that is automatically part of domestic
law. Rather, it is a creature of treaty and statute. One writer has argued
that it "is not so much a rule of international law as a consideration
based on policy and expediency". 5 Thus, the fugitive cannot raise double
criminality as a bar to extradition if the applicable treaty or statute is
silent. In Factor v. Laubenheimer,6 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the rule is based not on international law but on treaty.
This position has recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court of
3 I. Shearer, Extradition in International Law (Manchester U.P., 1971) 137-141. See
also Karle, "Some Problems Concerning the Application of the European Convention
on Extradition", in Legal Aspects of Extradition Among European States (1970) 51,
and H. Schulz, 'The Principles of the Traditional Law of Extradition", in ibid, at 7,
12-13.
4 L. Oppenheim, International Law (8th ed., 1955) 701.
5 H. V. E. Hartley Booth, British Extradition Law and Procedure (1980) 50, citing
O'Higgins, British and Irish Extradition Law and Practice (1961) (unpublished Ph.
D. thesis). See also Brabyn, "Exceptional Accusation Cases under the Extradition
Acts 1870 to 1935" [1987] Crim. L. R. 796, at 797 n. 7.
6 290 U.S. 276 (1923).
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Canada in United States v. Charles McVey II7 where in that court and
the lower courts "reference was made to abstract principles and 'rules'
of extradition such as double criminality, specialty and reciprocity as
if they had independent force". The court concluded that this was not
the case; that there is no obligation to extradite under customary
international law or under the common law; that treaties create the
obligation to do so and that therefore the parameters of those obligations
must be found within the four corners of the treaties. The customary
international law based upon the practice of states 'may no doubt have
a certain value in interpreting the law', [as noted in another decision of
the same court in United States v. Allards] but in the end the interna-
tional duty must be found in the terms of the appropriate treaty".9
There appears in the past to have been some confusion between the
distinct principle of double criminality and that of the extraditable
offence. Section 2 of the Canadian Extradition Act provides that an
"extradition crime" is one that if committed in Canada or within Cana-
dian jurisdiction would be one of the crimes listed in Schedule I of the
Act. The majority of Canada's older extradition treaties which pre-date
the new "no list" approach, to be discussed later, also have a schedule.
Section 3 of the Act provides that where there is an inconsistency
between the Act and the treaty, the treaty will prevail. In these schedule
or "list" treaties, the approach can be said to be two-tiered. The first
issue is whether the offence is listed or not in the treaty. If it is not, then
extradition is not possible. On the other hand, if the offence is so listed,
it is necessary to move to the second issue and consider whether double
criminality exists. As will be developed later in this article, in the new
treaties which adopt the "no list" approach, the principles of double
criminality and duality of punishability are of primary importance. As
one author has argued: "[tihe requirement of double criminality pro-
7 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 475, hereinafter "McVey IP.
8 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 861, 865.
9 Supra n. 7, at 508. This was also the position in R. v. Parisien, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 950.
But see I. Shearer, supra n. 3, at 138: 'Me rule seems to be universally established
by practice, however, that it could without much doubt be regarded as a customary
rule of international law should the question ever arise as a result of some chance
omission in the wording of a treaty'. This does not seem to gel with actual state
practice as evidenced in the case law. See also In re Assarsson, 687 F. 2d 1157 (8th
Cir. 1982); In re Assarsson, 635 F. 2d 1237 (7th Cir. 1980).
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vides the substantive basis needed to ensure that the process shall not
... be arbitrary".10
III. Recent Trends
At the outset of this discussion, it must be mentioned that there is
a recent trend in Canadian negotiation of new bilateral extradition
treaties, as is evidenced by the treaties with France," India,1 the
Netherlands,3 the Philippines 4 and the United States of America, 5
which shows that Canada and other states are opting for the "no list"
scheme. This determines extraditability on the basis of double criminal-
ity and a minimum punishability requirement rather than on an enu-
merated schedule of offences in the treaty. This approach will prevent
outmoded lists and allows for more offences potentially to be extradit-
able.16 However, it is still a requirement that the offence is criminal in
both the requesting and requested states. The concentration is not on
the strict denomination of the offence but upon the conduct constituting
the criminal offence. The denomination or enumerative approach, may
vary radically between countries and even between states in a federal
10 Bassiouni, supra, n. 1, at 322. There has been considerable debate as to the two
potential ways to interpret double criminality. The in ooncreto, or objective, approach
looks to the exact labelling of the offence and its constituent elements. See (1970) 41
R. Int. Dr. Pen. 12 for resolutions adopted by the 1969 10th Congress of the Inter-
national Association of Penal Law, which indicates a preference for the in concreto
approach. The in abstracto, or subjective, approach looks to the actual criminal
nature of the act without undue preponderance on the label and full identity of the
elements in the states. See C. van den Wyngaert, 'Double Criminality as a Require-
ment to Jurisdiction' in N. Jareborg, ed., Double Crimiinaity Studies in International
Law (1989) 43 for an example of preference for the in abstracto approach.
11 1989 Can. T. S. No. 36.
12 1987 Can. T.S. No. 14.
13 1991 Can. T.S. No. 32.
14 1990 Can. T.S. No. 36.
15 1976 Can. T. S. No. 3 as amended by Protocol 1991 Can. T.S. No. 37. Hereinafter
'1976 Extradition Treaty.
16 Fiscal offences that are not extraditable at present under "list' treaties unless
specifically provided for in treaties are a case in point. Note, however, that the
exception, even in list treaties was eroded by the House of Lords in R. v. Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, exparte Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1988]
1 W.L.R. 1204 (H.L.).
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system such as the United States of America. The move of the "no list"
approach is away from a rigid interpretation of extraditable offences
within treaty schedules and the consequent emphasis is on the conduct
of the fugitive.
IV. Canadian Jurisprudence Interpreting Double Criminality
The position long taken by Canadian courts has been that where
there was an applicable schedule of offences appended to a treaty, it was
not necessary for Canada and the requesting state to use the same
terminology or denomination. The key factor appears to have been that
the offender has committed what amounts to an offence in both states
and that a prima facie case is established. In the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Cotroni v. AG. of Canada,17 the court held that the
test to be used is what is the essence of the offence. Accordingly, it does
not matter that the specific indictment if it had been issued in Canada
would have been under the Criminal Code or any other statute. There
is consequently no requirement of exact identity between the offence
charged in the requesting state and the Canadian offence. The emphasis
is on the criminal conduct. Illustrative of this position is United States
v. Smith, 8 where Justice Borins held that the conduct alleged against
the fugitive is central to the hearing that results from the extradition
request; that the inquiry is not focused on the legal framework of the
requesting state, but rather the set of facts that constitute the fugitive's
conduct must be fitted into Canadian criminal law in order to see
whether an offence and if so, what offence is constituted under that law.
Using this so-called "conduct test", it is not necessary to determine
whether the requesting state can make out a prima facie case under its
criminal law. The essence is the sufficiency of evidence in Canada. '9
This issue was brought before the Supreme Court of Canada once
again in Washington v. Johnson2° where the applicable treaty was the
1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States, which
contained a list of offences. Justice Wilson, writing for the majority,
17 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 219. See also In re Briabois (1962), 133 C.C.C. 188 (Ont. H.C.) and
Virginia v. Cohen, [1973] F.C. 622.
18 (1984) 15 C.C.C. 3d 16.
19 United States v. Caro-Payan, Ont. D.C., Feb. 18, 1988 (unreported).
20 (1988), 40 C.C.C. 3d, 548.
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stated that the issue was whether the requesting state must establish
that the offence charged in the requesting state is an offence in Canada
or whether it is sufficient to show that the conduct charged would have
amounted to a Canadian crime, listed in the treaty, if it had occurred
in Canada.2' The Court noted that Article 2 of the Treaty required a
combination of extraditable crime and double criminality, with a mini-
mum punishability of one year, and held that the double criminality rule
looks to the conduct of the fugitive.2 As in the Cotroni2 and Smith2
cases the Court held that there is no need for exact identity in termi-
nology nor for the elements of the crime to be the same in both states.
This would as a practical matter be an impossible task to accomplish,25
even in two common law states with similar criminal systems. In McVey
11,26 Justice La Forest, speaking for the majority, clearly articulated the
Canadian approach when he noted that in Canada the practice devel-
oped of giving the extradition judge the role of identifying the crime for
which the fugitive was charged according to Canadian law. Thus, the
crime as it is known in the requesting state is set out in the information
and the arrest warrant and the extradition judge at the extradition
hearing identifies the equivalent Canadian crime.
However, there was some controversy in recent Canadian jurispru-
dence as to whether the extradition crime had to be listed in the
schedule of offences attached to an extradition treaty in the names
under which it is known in the requesting state and Canada. In other
words was a double listing necessary? This restrictive approach was
taken by Justice Borins in Smith 2 and by Justice Wilson in Johnson, 2




22 Ibid, at 553.
23 Supra n. 17.
24 Supra n. 18.
25 See Hartley Booth, supra n. 5, at 50, where he states that the extradition court cannot
become a tribunal of foreign law. See also R. v. Governor of Pentonvile Prison exparte
Elliott, [1975] Crim. L.R. 516 and R. v. Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte
Narang, [1978] A.C. 247.
26 Supra n. 7, at 512.
27 Supra n. 18, at 28.
28 Supra n. 20. In In re Osgoshi, No. CC891575 (British Columbia Supreme Court,
Nov. 3, 1989) (unreported) a similar line of reasoning was adopted.
29 G. V. La Forest, Extradition To and From Canada (2nd ed., 1977) 42.
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An extradition crime may be broadly defined as an act of which a
person is accused, or has been convicted of having committed within
the jurisdiction of one state that constitutes a crime in that state and
in the state where that person is found, and that is mentioned or
described in an extradition treaty between those states under a name
or description by which it is known in each state.
A different view was taken by Justice Smith sitting as extradition
judge in United States v. Caro-Payan3" and United States v. Golitschek.
3 1
She stressed that "a treaty must be [given] a liberal interpretation in
working to achieve its stated ends".32 She applied the British cases of
In re Neilsen33 and United States v. McCaffery3 and held that the old
double criminality test, which required an almost exact pairing of all the
constituent elements of the offence, is not the requisite test today.
Instead, the conduct test should be applied. The extradition judge "need
only consider whether the evidence against the fugitive would justify a
committal for trial if the 'conduct alleged' had been committed in Canada,
and that conduct is a crime listed in the Treaty". 5 The Caro-Payan
decision with respect to there being no need for an exact pairing of the
constituent elements is non-controversial. However, most pertinent to
this article is Justice Smith's underlying rationale which appears to
have been that as long as the conduct would be criminal if committed
in Canada, and if that conduct is a listed crime in a treaty, then there
is no necessity for it to be also referred to in the treaty list under a name
by which it is known in the requesting state. This view would appear
to go against the grain of the La Forest text, that both crimes would have
to be listed in the treaty before extradition could be granted. As this
writer has commented elsewhere, however much assistance a doctrinal
view may be, it is clearly not binding on the courts.- There is a good
argument to be made that Article 2(1) of the 1976 Canada-United States
Extradition Treaty does not require such double listing.
The most recent case in Canada on point is of especial interest as it
has cleared up the single or double listing dispute. United States v.
30 Supra n. 19.
31 (Ont. D.C. January 1986) (unreported).
32 Supra n. 19.
33 [1984] 2 All E.R. 84 (H.L).
34 [1984] 2 All E.R. 570 (H.L.).
35 Supra n. 19.
36 Williams, supra n. 2, at 608.
Nos. 1-2, 1993]
ISRAEL LAW REVIEW
McVey I involved an extradition request for the offence of conspiracy
to export high-technology equipment to the former U.S.S.R. and ten
counts of making false statements to the United States Department of
Commerce and the United States Customs Service to put such export
into effect. The applicable 1976 Extradition Treaty did not list this
making of false statements as an extraditable offence. However, the
extradition judge was of the view that he could commit the fugitive for
the purposes of extradition because firstly, the conduct of the fugitive
would if done in Canada have constituted the crime of forgery under the
Canadian Criminal Code, 37 and secondly, because forgery is listed in the
1976 treaty. McVey's conduct did not constitute forgery in the United
States. The extradition judge rejected the argument that it was neces-
sary for the crime to be listed in the treaty under the name by which
it is known in the United States. This decision was reversed upon
habeas corpus which was subsequently upheld by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal.3 The Court of Appeal interpreted the Johnson case to
mean that double listing was essential, referring also to the passage
from the La Forest text. 9
None of the earlier cases, apart from Caro-Payan and Golitschek,
bear directly upon the McVey case, in that in the Smith case murder
and manslaughter, the names by which the fugitive's conduct was
classified respectively in the United States and Canada were both
contained in the treaty list. In Johnson, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned with the question of whether the crime for which the fugitive was
sought would be a crime contained in the treaty list by a name known
under the criminal law of Canada. The difficult question is to decide
what construction must be placed upon Article 2(1) of the treaty which
provides:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of this
treaty for any of the offences listed in the Schedule annexed to this
Treaty, which is an integral part of this Treaty, provided that these
offences are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by
a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.
37 See R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, se. 366 and 321.
38 (1989), 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 28.
39 Ibid., at 30.
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When the wording of this Article is examined closely, it is apparent
that it can be divided into two parts. Firstly, the person shall be
extradited according to the provisions of the treaty for any of the
offences listed in the Schedule and secondly, that the listed offences
must be punishable by the laws of both contracting parties by a term
of imprisonment of no less than one year. As indicated above there is
agreement that there is no need for the denomination of the offence to
be the same in both states and neither does the scope of liability need
to be co-extensive. The criminality of the conduct in both states is the
keynote. The intention of the parties to the treaty was to extradite on
the basis of reciprocity and the second part of Article 2(1) should be read
in this light. There must be a fair and liberal interpretation of extradi-
tion treaties that will not unduly narrow the operation of the Treaty. It
is submitted that the term "offences" in Article 2(1) should be read to
mean "conduct" and any "conduct" listed in the Treaty should be extra-
ditable, provided it meets the two part test contained therein. This
would fit well with the analysis of Neilsen, McCafferiy" and Caro-
Payan.42 It should also be recognized that Article 9(3) of the 1976 Treaty
provides that there is to be "such evidence, as according to the terms of
the requested state, would justify his arrest and committal for trial if
the offence had been committed there.. . ." This is an important
safeguard for the fugitive. The basis for these Articles is found in section
18 of the Extradition Act.
Double criminality interfaces with the principle of specialty. This
principle holds that a person extradited shall not be tried or punished
in the requesting state for an offence other than that for which extra-
dition was granted. 43 It is linked to the rigid approach of non-extradition
exhibited by the Court of Appeal in McVey II. However, if a rigid
technical interpretation is made of Article 2(1) of the 1976 Treaty, it
would result in complex difficulties concerning criminal conduct. The
Court of Appeal held that as McVey's conduct would not be prosecuted
as "forgery" under the U.S. Code and other legislation, this would result
40 Supra n. 33.
41 Supra n. 34.
42 Supra n. 19.
43 E.g., Art. XII of the 1976 Canada-United States Extradition Treaty.
Nos. 1-2, 1993]
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in a violation of the specialty principle." This type of analysis seems
artificial and would defeat the purpose of the Treaty, which is reciproc-
ity and recognition by both states of the fact that the alleged conduct
is criminal. The emphasis must lie on the conduct for which extradition
was granted and not upon the denomination; unrelated offences alleg-
edly committed before the extradition took place are not included.
The Supreme Court of Canada in McVey II noted that the Court of
Appeal considered itselfbound by Johnson, although the latter conceded
that the facts were the reverse. In Johnson, the issue was that the
requesting state had to establish that the crime for which the fugitive
was wanted would constitute a crime listed in the treaty according to
the law of Canada. Justice La Forest, speaking for the majority, found
that the Court of Appeal in coming to its decision "was obviously affected
by a reference to the definition of extradition crime in [his] text... which
had been cited by Justice Wilson [in Johnson]". He went on to note, as
has been argued earlier in this part, that the definition in a book is not
a substitute for the Extradition Act itself, and it should be added, the
Treaty. The definition in the text was, he stated, meant to be "a broad
description viewed from the perspective of the whole of the extradition
process" and not to be used in lieu of the Act itself. He, therefore,
dispatched with a requirement for double listing.
In sum, the McVey II Court held that what must be established is
that the conduct of the fugitive would, if it had occurred in Canada,
constitute a crime listed in the Treaty according to a name by which it
is known under the law of Canada. Justice La Forest concluded that
"[t]he issue is not whether the crime charged is called forgery or not in
either country, but whether the conduct charged can fairly be said to fall
within the expressions 'forgery' and 'conspiracy' in the treaty". With
respect to specialty Justice La Forest alludes briefly to the fact that
under Article 12(1) of the 1976 Treaty, the fugitive may only be pros-
ecuted by the requesting state for the offence for which extradition is
made. He states that "... the identity of that offence can be determined
44 (1988), 30 B.C.L.R. 2d 197. See in accord the dissenting judgment of Justice Sopinka
in the Supreme Court of Canada. For cases dealing with offences under United
States' laws such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970) and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (CCE),
21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1970) see Sudar v. United States (1981), 39 N.R. 433; Riley v.
Commonwealth (1985), 60 A.L.J.R. 106 (Austl.) and Hagerman v. United States
(1988), 44 C.C.C. 3d 157.
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by reference to the text of that law supplied with the requisition".4 The
appeal was allowed and the order of committal of the extradition judge
reinstated.
The Supreme Court's decision in McVey II is to be applauded. Even
though the 1991 Protocol to the 1976 Treaty has adopted the no-list
approach and applies to all extradition requests between Canada and
the United States made after its entry into force, even where the
criminal conduct took place before that date, the decision is of critical
importance to the interpretation of those treaties that retain the sched-
ule of extraditable offences.
V. Evidence of Foreign Law
The extradition judge is not mandated under the Extradition Act to
consider the foreign law. It is the role of the executive, in the person of
the Minister of Justice that has that task. In McVey II Justice La Forest
stated that it is not unreasonable for the Minister to rely on the material
supplied by the requesting state with the requisition as proof of the
foreign law. This is supported by similar acceptance by the Supreme
Court in Johnson and by the House of Lords in Government of Belgium
v. Postlewaite.4 It should also be noted that under section 22 of the Act
the Minister may at any time refuse to surrender the fugitive and order
her discharged. As Justice La Forest noted, the Act "does not deal with
proof of foreign law at all".41 In his opinion to require proof of foreign law
in an extradition proceeding would serve no useful purpose and would
seriously impede the effective cooperation of the two states in the
repression of criminal conduct.'8
This is in acccord with the view expressed in Argentina v. Mellino"9
that the function of the extradition hearing and the role of the extradi-
tion judge is a modest one, albeit of critical importance to the fugitive.
The extradition judge has to determine whether there is sufficient
45 Supra n. 7, at 535.
46 (1987] 3 W.L.R. 365, 390-91. (H.L.)
47 Supra n. 7.
48 Ibid
49 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
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evidence of an extraditable offence, based on the criminality of the
conduct. As was held in Canada v. Schmidt:50
The hearing thus protects the individual in this country from being
surrendered for trial for a crime in a foreign country unless prima
facie evidence is produced that he or she has done something there
that would constitute a crime mentioned in the treaty if committed
here.
Recently, Lord Acker in the House of Lords decision in R. v. Governor
of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Sinclair51stated in a similar vein that an
extradition judge "has important but very limited functions to perform".
The concern here as expressed in McVey II is that it would put into
question the good faith or competence of the foreign requesting state to
doubt that the crime does not exist under the foreign law,52 when most
treaties including the 1976 Canada-United States Treaty provide that
the request be accompanied by the pertinent text of the criminal law of
the foreign state, describing the offence and prescribing the requisite
punishment, as well as the warrant of arrest issued in that state.
In the previous section on double criminality, it was seen that the
Canadian extradition judge is concerned with the criminality of the
conduct, if it had occurred in Canada. The Canadian court deals with
the criminal offence under Canadian law. In McVey II, Justice La Forest
stated that he could not see how the proof of foreign law would advance
the purpose of the extradition hearing and that to require evidence
beyond the documents currently supplied with the request could cripple
the extradition proceedings." He viewed it as unthinkable that the
states parties would have contemplated this when they entered into the
treaty relationship. In a pragmatic way he states that "[tihe criminal
community would certainly welcome the need to prove foreign law.
Flying witnesses in to engage in abstruse debates about legal issues
arising in a legal system with which the judge is unfamiliar is a certain
recipe for delay and confusion to no useful purpose, particularly if one
contemplates the joys of translation and the entirely different structure
50 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 515.
51 [1991] 2 A. C. 64 , 82 (H.L.).
52 Supra n. 50, at 516.
53 Supra n. 7, at 528. He notes the exception of political offences that may be expressly
assigned to the judge.
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of foreign systems of law"." Support for this position may be found in
In re Neilsen" where Goff L.J. in the Divisional Court stated that the
proceedings "do not involve any consideration of foreign law at all"," and
in Sinclair where Lord Acker stated poignantly that:67
Your Lordships are concerned with the construction of an Act passed
over a hundred years ago. I cannot accept that the legislature in-
tended that it was to be part of the function of the police magistrate
to preside over lengthy proceedings occupying weeks, and on occa-
sions months, of his time hearing heavily contested evidence of
foreign law directed to whether there had been due compliance with
the many and varied obligations of the Treaty. The inconvenience of
such a procedure is well demonstrated by the current litigation.
VI. Conclusion
The conduct test coupled with a dual punishability requirement is
the most practical and appropriate mode of determining the extradit-
able nature of the offence. In list treaties, unless so provided in the
treaty, double listing of the offence should not be required. The focus is
on the legal framework of the forum state and proof of the requesting
state's law is not required beyond the documents supplied with the
requisition. This is in keeping with inter-state cooperation in criminal
matters and also adheres to the protection of the individual fugitive's
interests.
54 Ibid.
55 (1983), 79 Cr. App. IL 1.
56 Ibid., at 11. He also notes the exception of offences of a political character.
57 Supra n. 51, at 91.
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